Confession (iqrār) constitutes one of the most significant forms of evidence in legal proceedings, defined jurisprudentially as "an individual's acknowledgment of a right to the detriment of oneself and to the benefit of another." This article critically examines the nature, probative force, and evidentiary value of confession, with particular attention to the possibility of conflicts arising between multiple confessions. The analysis proceeds in two stages: First, it identifies and evaluates the four necessary conditions for such conflicts to arise: (1) the existence of at least two pieces of evidence, (2) the logical incompatibility of their implications, (3) the unity of subject matter, and (4) the concurrent probative force of the evidence. Second, the possibility of conflicts between confessions is assessed against these conditions, demonstrating that no conflict can arise between the confession of a claimant and that of a respondent due to the absence of condition three (unity of subject matter). Regarding conflicts between multiple respondents’ confessions, the study contrasts three jurisprudential approaches: (1) application of tasāquṭ (mutual nullification), (2) resolution by drawing lots (qurʿah), and (3) equal division of liability among confessing parties - concluding that the third approach is more legally and logically justified.