In light of the imperative to protect vulnerable groups within international criminal law, and given that neither the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) nor the 1948 Genocide Convention expressly defines "group," this article undertakes a critical examination of the concept through an analysis of legal doctrine, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1998 Rome Statute, the ICC’s draft statute, as well as the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). This analysis serves two critical purposes: first, to clarify the contested scope of "group" under international law; second, to evaluate the feasibility of expanding the ICC’s jurisdictional reach to encompass non-enumerated groups, such as political or cultural collectivities. The study establishes that the absence of objective criteria for distinguishing non-protected groups – particularly political and cultural collectives, combined with state sovereignty concerns regarding an expanded "group" doctrine and fears that broader incrimination of genocide could impede ratification of relevant instruments, constitutes the primary rationale underlying the continued exclusive criminal protection of the four enumerated groups (national, ethnical, racial, and religious) under the Convention and the Rome Statute.