This study examines the scope of judicial knowledge in establishing ḥudūd offences by analyzing the tension between two competing normative frameworks:the judge’s epistemic authority as a means of accessing factual truth,and the precautionary structure governing ḥudūd,reinforced by the principle of darʾ al-ḥudūd bi-l-shubuhāt,which restricts any expansion of evidentiary grounds.This tension becomes particularly significant in the Iranian legal system,where judicial knowledge is formally recognized alongside textual proofs,yet its boundaries remain insufficiently articulated,creating ambiguity that may undermine evidentiary coherence and judicial security.Using an analytical–inferential method,the research reconstructs the doctrinal foundations of Imāmī jurisprudence and critically evaluates statutory provisions to clarify the relationship between the epistemic validity of judicial knowledge and the divine-right nature of ḥudūd.The findings demonstrate that judicial knowledge in Imāmī thought has a dual function:while it may operate as a general epistemic pathway in taʿzīr offences,its role in ḥudūd is constrained by the dominance of precaution and the non-negotiable character of the punishments.Consequently, it can only serve as a tool for assessing the reliability of textual proofs rather than functioning as an independent evidentiary basis. The analysis of Iranian law further reveals that the undifferentiated expansion of judicial knowledge is inconsistent with jurisprudential principles and the philosophy of caution underlying ḥudūd, increasing the risk of discretionary adjudication. The study concludes that the validity of judicial knowledge in ḥudūd must be confined to evaluating and controlling textual evidence, and that legislative clarification is essential to preserve evidentiary coherence and reinforce judicial security.