نوع مقاله : علمی- پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Notwithstanding the explicit provisions of the Monetary and Banking Act of Iran, pursuant to which the Central Bank and its principal decision-making body, namely the Money and Credit Council, are recognized as the primary monetary policymakers, and despite the fact that various provisions of the said law address monetary policymaking in a manner suggesting that the Central Bank functions as the sole policymaking authority acting independently from other institutions, practical experience demonstrates that both the legislative and executive branches intervene in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. This article, while examining the institutional position and authority of the various monetary policymaking bodies, analyzes certain instances of duality, inconsistency, and conflict arising from the legislative and executive branches’ regulatory interventions in the realm of monetary policymaking. The study demonstrates the consequences of intervention by non-specialized governmental institutions in monetary policy and explains how such intervention constrains the autonomy and effective functioning of the specialized monetary authority, which, by its very nature, ought to operate independently. Furthermore, the article explores the potentially adverse economic consequences arising from the erosion of central bank independence and institutional coherence in monetary governance.
کلیدواژهها English
