This study explores the phenomenon of legislative individualism as a structural challenge within Iran’s legal system, focusing on the Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 2013 (1392 A.H.S.) and amended in 2015 (1394 A.H.S.). Legislative individualism refers to a condition in which legislative or quasi-legislative powers are centralized in the will of a single individual rather than distributed among multiple institutions. This concentration of authority undermines the principles of separation of powers and collective rationality, producing a system where individual discretion can override institutional checks and balances. Employing a descriptive–analytical method based on the examination of legal documents and content analysis, the research identifies over sixty provisions in the Code that make the enforcement of laws contingent upon the approval, discretion, or directive of the Head of the Judiciary. Such a concentration of authority reveals a form of person-centered lawmaking that distorts the legislative function and poses potential risks to citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms. Drawing upon Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the general will, John Locke’s theory of limited sovereignty, and Jürgen Habermas’s notion of communicative rationality, the study argues that legislative individualism diminishes the democratic legitimacy of lawmaking processes. The findings suggest that if this trend continues, it may further weaken transparency, accountability, and public trust in Iran’s criminal justice system, ultimately challenging the normative foundation of democratic governance and the rule of law.