The principle of a public trial is one of the fundamental guarantees of a fair trial, which assumes twofold importance in political offenses due to the confrontation between the citizen and the state. Article 168 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes the public nature of proceedings for political offenses; however, Article 305 of the Criminal Procedure Code (2013), with the aim of accommodating the view of the Guardian Council, has restricted this principle to the exceptions set forth in Article 352 (such as public order and public morality). The present study, employing a descriptive-analytical method, examines the foundations and consequences of this restriction. Findings indicate that the Guardian Council’s approach faces three fundamental challenges: conflating the nature of political offenses with concepts such as public morality; expanding the jurisdiction of Sharia supervision to constitutional principles through a "prescriptive" (Insha'i) approach to Article 4; and disrupting the hierarchy of norms, which places the judge in an interpretive deadlock. To preserve the coherence of the legal system, it is essential to adopt a "declarative" (Ikhbari) reading of Article 4, wherein this article is merely deemed an a priori confirmation of the Islamic nature of the constitutional text. Finally, it is recommended that Article 305 of the Criminal Procedure Code be amended to restore the absolute application of Article 168, and that an interpretive opinion be issued by the Guardian Council to restrict the supervisory scope of Article 4 to ordinary laws.