In the Islamic Republic of Iran, alongside the Islamic Consultative Assembly, there are other institutions with varying degrees of rule-making authority. superpower councils such as the Supreme National Security Council, the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, the Supreme Cyberspace Council, and the Supreme Council for Economic Coordination of the Three Branches of Government are examples of such institutions. Given the fact that these superpower councils enact legal rules in the Iranian legal system, the issue of oversight over their decisions arises. This research, with a descriptive-analytical approach, seeks to answer the question of on what basis the oversight of the decisions of superpower councils can be justified. According to the findings of this study, the first basis for the necessity of monitoring the approvals of the superpower councilsis to ensure compliance with the principle of the rule of law and the hierarchy of legal norms, which, considering the position of the approvals of the superpower councilsin the hierarchy of norms in the Iranian legal system, proves the necessity of their compatibility and non-contradiction with the standards of Sharia, the Constitution, and the general policies of the system. The second basis is to ensure compliance with the principle of specialization, which is the same as the principle of incompetence in public law. In order to ensure that the superpower councilsdo not exceed their scope of competence and expertise through monitoring. The third and fourth basis are the implications of the principles of the Constitution and the general policies of the legislative system.