Commanders can be held criminally liable for the actions of their subordinates in two main ways: first, by failing to prevent a crime, and second, by neglecting to impose punishment on those subordinates. A significant challenge within this framework is the criminal liability of a successor commander for crimes committed by subordinates before they assumed command. In international criminal law, a successor commander is defined as someone who takes over command after a crime has been committed by subordinates, The question of a successor commander's criminal responsibility was notably discussed in the case of Hadžihasanović and Kubura, where judges expressed differing opinions. Some believed that a successor commander bears no responsibility for crimes committed by subordinates prior to their command. Conversely, others argued that the successor could be held accountable for failing to impose punishment. Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber ruled that Kubura was not criminally responsible for failing to punish crimes committed before he assumed command. Despite this ruling, the issue of successor commander liability remains ambiguous, with no established custom or regulation clearly defining responsibilities. Given the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, the likelihood of this challenge arising is heightened, particularly in the International Criminal Court. This study aims to clarify the ambiguities surrounding the successor commander's responsibilities by identifying elements of the doctrine of superior criminal responsibility and comparing them with the actions of successor commanders. The findings indicate that successor commanders can be held criminally responsible in certain cases.