The concept of "Will" plays a pivotal role in criminal law as the cornerstone of criminal responsibility. Despite this fundamental importance, the position of "Will" and the distinct concept of "Voluntariness of Action" in the doctrine of Iranian criminal law have always been a point of convergence for conflicting views, deep conceptual ambiguity, and significant divergence of opinions. A discourse analysis of Iranian criminal law doctrine reveals that three competing views locate "Will" in the "Material Element”, the "Mental Element", or the "domain of criminal responsibility”, respectively. This confusion, has led to contradictions in judicial analyses. Aiming to resolve this confusion and by raising the question of where the precise place of these two concepts lies in the analytical structure of crime, this research rethinks the foundations of these views. Adopting a critical approach, this article analyzes the foundations and consequences of each of the three competing views. The findings indicate that placing "Will" in the Mental Element or the domain of responsibility stems from conflating these two concepts and leads to insoluble structural contradictions (especially in the analysis of duress). Ultimately, this research defends the view that "Will”, as a philosophical concept, has no direct place in the elements of crime. Accordingly, involuntary behaviors are excluded from the realm of criminal law primarily due to the absence of "conduct”. This doctrinal reconstruction, while refining the Material and Mental Elements, contributes to the coherence of the analytical structure of crime in the Iranian legal system.