With the proliferation of asymmetrical conflicts and non-state actors' access to novel technologies, bioterrorism has become one of the most complex threats to international peace and security. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the present study seeks to address the primary question: What capacities and loopholes exist within the systems of international law and international criminal law in confronting and suppressing the phenomenon of bioterrorism? The research hypothesis is predicated on the premise that although the evolution of international instruments—from the 1925 Geneva Protocol to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Rome Statute—has provided an appropriate legislative foundation for criminalizing bioterrorism as a war crime and a crime against humanity, recent advancements in biology have undermined the efficacy of traditional, "material-centric" regimes. The research findings indicate that effectively countering this threat strongly necessitates the development of "data-centric" norms, the establishment of binding verification mechanisms for dual-use research, the disruption of terrorist financial arteries, and the comprehensive harmonization of states' national criminal laws.