The nature of the family has long been a subject of debate among philosophers, sociologists, and, consequently, legal scholars. Within the philosophy of family law, various perspectives exist regarding the legal nature of the family, notably the contractual approach, the institutional approach, and the concept of granting legal personality to the family. While individualistic approaches—leaning toward the idea of ​​the family as a contract—reduce family law to the rights of its individual members and reject the notion of the family as a distinct legal entity, proponents of the primacy of the family argue that its collective identity necessitates treating it as a legal person. However, even among the latter group, there is no consensus on the nature of this legal personality: some view the family—based on its inherent nature—as a real, pre-legal entity, whereas others regard the realization of the family’s legal personality as contingent upon political will and legislative enactment. This study seeks to address the historical tension between viewing the family as a mere collection of distinct individuals and regarding it as a unified entity possessing independent legal personality. By examining relevant literature and redefining the family as a legal person, this research analyzes the historical contexts and intellectual foundations that gave rise to the theory of family legal personality, thereby laying the groundwork for a comprehensive exposition of this theory.